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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether Mrs. Yeaman should have been awarded all of

the sale proceeds from the S I I U m

ii

i m t 11 «n 1 i tt. nii-mi t ,

Applicable Standard of Review:

The division of marital

prope i t: .} ii , matter of equity and the trial court 7 s decision
will be reviewed to determine i\
discretion.

Uio trial cant I. .iluiwed ili<

Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).

II.

Whethei 1 1 i

Ye .< i,i " tc .i i should have been awarded all

of the marital property.
Applicable Standard of Review: The division of marital
]JI u p * mi i \ in

mi nil I I M I

i if i'quit )

L's decision
"i rm

will be reviewed to determine if • r.*
discretion.

^ourt abused its

Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).

Yeaman's Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact f Conclusions
of
«

a-"•••! Judgment and Order or , ii i the Alternative, Motion for
.

Applicable Standard of Review:
i

lovember 21, 1994

*?

1

Said motion was filed
court's denial of a

trial court abused its discretion by acting unreasonably.
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988).
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The duty of the court to divide property, debts and
obligations equitably:
U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) (1994):
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders relating to
the children, property, debts or obligations and
parties.
Mr. Yeaman's right to a new trial:
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
[A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered . . . amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court
. . . o r any order of the court, or abuse of discretion
by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial.
(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at
the trial.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision or order that is against the
law.
(7) Error in law.
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Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court may amend its
findings or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. and Mrs. Yeaman were married on May 12, 1991. On
February 2, 1993 Mr. Yeaman filed a Verified Complaint for
Divorce. (R. 002).
At the Pre-Trial Conference on November 22, 1993 the
parties stipulated that this matter should be bifurcated; that
defendant, Ms. Yeaman, should be awarded the divorce; that Mr.
Yeaman7s attorney should be allowed to withdraw and that all
other issues should be reserved for further hearing.

(R. 037).

Accordingly, a Decree of Divorce pursuant to the above
stipulation was entered on December 7, 1993.

(R. 048).

On March 8, 1994 the parties stipulated that the
marital residence located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah
could be sold consistent with the terms of an earnest money
agreement with the Bells.

It was also agreed that $5,000.00 of

the proceeds would be distributed to Ms. Yeaman and the remainder
would be held in escrow.

(R. 065) .

The trial of the remaining issues was held on September
9, 1994 in the Third Judicial District Court the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell presiding.

(R. 094). Judge Bunnell filed his Memorandum

Decision on September 20, 1994 and the Findings of Fact and

3

Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order regarding the trial
were entered on November 10, 1994

(R. 098-103 and 109-119).

On November 21, 1994 Mr. Yeaman filed a Motion to Alter
or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and
Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial.
136).

Said motion was denied on February 3, 1995.

(R. 122-

(R. 172-176).

The Notice of Appeal herein was filed on March 2, 1995.

(R.

177) .
The following facts are divided into numbered
paragraphs to make reference thereto more convenient:
1.

The parties herein were married on May 12, 1991.

2.

On October 23, 1991 the parties purchased a

(R. 275).

residence located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah.

(R.

251) .
3.

Title to said marital residence was in the name of

Ms. Yeaman who immediately thereafter, on the same day, conveyed
the property to herself and Mr. Yeaman.
4.

(R. 251 and 269-270).

On September 24, 1993 Mr. Yeaman signed a Quit

Claim Deed regarding the marital residence wherein Mrs. Yeaman
was the grantee.
5.

(R. 208).

The Court found that Mr. Yeaman signed the deed

freely and voluntarily contrary to the testimony of Mr. Yeaman.
(R. 112 and 208).
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6.

A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on

December 7, 1993, but the issues regarding the division of the
property were reserved for a subsequent trial.
7.

(R. 049).

The marital residence was sold on March 9, 1994 and

the net sale proceeds of $28,712.37 were held in escrow pending
an order of distribution from this Court.
8.

(R. 065 and 110).

Other assets which were divided by the Court are as

follows:
Assets

Value

a.

Miscellaneous personal property
(including household appliances,
furniture, furnishings and bank
accounts) (R. 202, 253 and 256)

b.

1989 Mercur Scorpio (R. 257)

c.

Wife's American Express Retirement
Account (R. 188-191)

d.

Interest in Kinetico and Power
Play tools (R. 199)

$20,000

2,000

figment of
Husband's
imagination

9.

The debts and obligations which were divided by the

Court are as follows:
a. Debt regarding 1989 Mercur Scorpio
(R. 257)
b.

Debt to Craig Wardle (R. 210)

$445.00

c.

Optima Card (R. 210)

2,223.00

d.

Wife's 1993 taxes (R. 249)

1,996.92

e.

Wife's 1992 taxes (R. 247)

2,448.00

f.

State of Utah (R. 114)

g.

David Patterson (R. 114)

259.06

5

81.75

10.

On Ms. Yeaman's Financial Declaration she claimed

that household furniture, furnishings and appliances had a value
of $30,000.00.

There was no indication thereon that she claimed

that part of it was owned by her prior to the marriage of the
parties.

(R. 030-036)
11.

During the pretrial conferences and other

discussions Ms. Yeaman never indicated that some of the household
furniture, furnishings and appliances had been stolen.

(R. 146-

147) . At the trial Ms. Yeaman claimed that the value of the
stolen household furniture, furnishings and appliances was
approximately $10,000.00.
12.

(R. 193).

A copy of the police report which Ms. Yeaman filed

was provided to the trial court in which she claims that the
value of the stolen property is $3,000.00.

(R. 141-145 and

Addendum D ) .
13.

The following are Ms. Yeaman's response to certain

requests for the production of documents which were submitted to
Ms. Yeaman on May 6, 1994:
REQUEST NO. 1: All evidence, including, but not
limited to, documents which defendant intends to or
believes may be introduced as an exhibit at the trial
of this action or which defendant intends to use in
examining or cross-examining witnesses.
RESPONSE: Defendant objects to Request No. 1.
Defendant will exchange trial exhibits with the
plaintiff consistent with the terms of the pretrial
order.
REQUEST NO. 2: All exhibits which defendant
intends to attempt to introduce at the time of trial of
the above-captioned matter.
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RESPONSE: Defendant objects to Request No. 2.
See response
to Request No. 2.

REQUEST NO. 9: All documents and accounting
records for the period of time from January 1, 1991 to
the present regarding any property which defendant
claims she owned prior to her marriage to plaintiff.
RESPONSE;

No documents exist.

REQUEST NO. 10; All documents and accounting
records regarding any property which defendant claims
is her separate property.
RESPONSE:

No documents exist.

REQUEST NO. 14: All documents and accounting
records regarding the purchase of the various items of
furniture, appliances, stereo equipment, televisions
and kitchen utensils, silverware and dishes which
defendant claims should be awarded to her in this
matter or which are in defendants control or
possession.
RESPONSE: Defendant lacks any documents
contemplated in Request No. 14.
(R. 126-127).
14.

The following instructions accompanied the above-

described requests for production of documents:
3. "Document" as used herein, shall mean the
original and all non-identical copies (whether
different from the original because of any alterations,
notes, comments, or other material contained therein or
attached thereto or otherwise) and drafts of all
written, printed, recorded or graphic matter of every
kind and description, together with any attachment
thereto or enclosure therewith in any way relating or
referring to or concerning the subject matter of the
request, whether inscribed by hand or mechanical,
electronic, micro-film, photographic, or by other
means, as well as phonic or visual reproductions, and
shall include, but is not limited to; diaries, notes,
memoranda, interoffice and intraoffice memoranda,
memoranda for file, memoranda of telephone
7

conversations, memoranda of meetings and conferences,
drafts, calculations, contracts, agreements, reports,
compilations, schedules, tabulations, tallies, charts,
tables, diagrams, drawings, minutes, minutes of
meetings, circulares, pamphlets, correspondence, plans,
specifications, vouchers, statements, letters,
invoices, ledgers, records, orders, checks, receipts
and bills, computer-stored data or data bases and
computer printouts, or any document such as a code for
a computer run or printout and any other retrievable
data in your possession, custody or control or known to
you, wherever located.
4. "Accounting records" as
used herein shall mean all documents and files of an
accounting nature, including by way of example and not
limitation: audits, invoices, receipts, bills of sale,
purchase orders, time sheets, notes, drafts, checks,
journals, ledgers, summaries, expense vouchers, bank
statements, canceled checks, deposit slips, periodic or
special reports, reviews, reconciliations, budgets,
reports and analyses and plaintiff's documents and
accounting records.
. . . .

5. Defendant's answer to each request for
documents and things shall include such documents
relating to such answer as are within defendant's
custody, possession or control, including but not
limited to, all documents in the custody, control or
possession of defendant's accountants, consultants,
attorneys or other agents.
6. Each of these requests is and shall be deemed
to be continuing. In the event at any later date
defendant obtains or becomes aware of any additional
documents not included with defendant's answers hereto,
defendant shall promptly notify plaintiff through his
counsel and amend defendant's answers to said request
accordingly to apprise plaintiff's counsel of such
additional documents in accordance with Rule 26(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 127-128).
15.

At the time of trial Ms. Yeaman introduced

documents which pertained to a Key Bank Account which she claimed
showed a deposit from a credit union account which she had
maintained prior to the marriage.

Said documents had not been

produced to Mr. Yeaman or his attorney until two days before the
trial.

(R. 138-139 and 147).
8

16.

At the trial on September 9, 1994 Mrs. Yeaman was

awarded the following assets:
Assets

Value

a.

Sale proceeds from residence

$28,712.37

b.

Miscellaneous personal property
(including household appliances,
furniture, furnishings and bank
accounts)

$20,000.00

c.

1989 Mercur Scorpio

d.

Ms. Yeaman7s American Express
Retirement Account

2,000.00

(R. 113, and 117-118 and Addendum A ) .
17.

Mr. Yeaman was awarded the following assets:
Asset

Value

Interest in Kinetico and Power
Play tools
(R. 113 and 118).
18.

figment of his
imagination

Mrs. Yeaman was required to pay the following

obligations:
a.

Debt regarding 1989 Mercur Scorpio

b.

Optima Card

2,223.00

c.

Her 1993 taxes

1,996.92

d.

Her 1992 taxes

2,448.00

(R. 112 and 118).
19.

Mr. Yeaman was required to pay the following

obligations:
a.

Debt to Craig Wardle

b.

State of Utah

c.

David Patterson

$445.00
259.06
81.75
9

(R. 113 and 118).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court made an error of law in ruling that
because of a deed which was executed by Mr. Yeaman to Mrs. Yeaman
regarding the sale of the marital residence the proceeds from the
sale of the residence should be awarded to Ms. Yeaman.

The deed

is irrelevant to an equitable division of the marital assets.
Furthermore, the trial court did not state any other reason for
awarding said proceeds to Ms. Yeaman and abused its discretion in
awarding all of the sale proceeds, the main asset of the
marriage, to Ms. Yeaman.
The trial court appeared to base its award of
essentially all of the remaining assets to Ms. Yeaman upon its
perception that Mr. Yeaman did not work during the marriage.

It

is an error of law to base the award upon said perception and it
is an abuse of discretion to award essentially all of the marital
property to Ms. Yeaman.

The trial court did not refer to any

other criteria as the basis for its award.
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Yeaman's motion to
amend or alter or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Ms.
Yeaman introduced new evidence that some of the property had been
stolen and the value thereof.

Said evidence was contradicted by

the police report which she filed and which was discovered as a
result of her claim that some property had been stolen.
Furthermore, Ms. Yeaman introduced new evidence at the time of
trial which she refused to produce in response to discovery
10

requests by Mr. Yeaman.

As a result Mr. Yeaman was prejudiced

and the trial court made the errors described above.
ARGUMENT
I. Mr. Yeaman Should be Awarded an Equitable Share of
the Proceeds From the Sale of the Marital Residence.
On page 3 of its Memorandum Decision the Court stated:
[T]he Plaintiff voluntarily executed the deed creating
a valid and legal conveyance whose presumption of
legality can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. The Plaintiff has presented no evidence to
defeat the legal consequence of a document that he
admittedly, freely and voluntarily signed.
The above-described deed should not have any effect on the
division of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that marital property
"encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived . . .
.M

Enqlert v. Enqlert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978).

In

Jefferies v. Jefferies. 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah App. 1995) the
Utah Court of Appeals stated that "First, all assets acquired by
the parties during marriage are to be considered by the trial
court when making an equitable distribution, unless the law
specifically prevents the court from considering a particular
asset."

The residence of the parties was clearly a marital asset

and should have been equitably divided by the trial court.
The residence was purchased during the marriage (R. 203
and 251) and was sold on March 25, 1994.

(R. 251). The purchase

price was negotiated by Mr. Yeaman. (R. 204) . The deed from the
seller was to Ms. Yeaman and the same day that the conveyance was
11

made to her she conveyed the home to herself and Mr. Yeaman.
231 and 270-271).

(R.

The loan to purchase the home was obtained in

the name of Ms. Yeaman because of negative credit of Mr. Yeaman.
(R. 257).
Ms. Yeaman testified that she obtained a loan against
her retirement for the down payment.

(R. 236). The amount of

the down payment was claimed to be $6,368.00 which differed from
her prior claim that the amount of the down payment was
$9,000.00.

(R. 237-238).

Ms. Yeaman testified that she made all

the house payments and that all house payments were made from her
wages.

(R. 262). The down payment loan was repaid by payroll

deductions.

(R. 265-266).

During the course of the trial Ms.

Yeaman's testimony changed from claiming that she had about
$1,000.00 in savings at the time of the marriage to she had about
$8,000.00 in savings at the time of the marriage.
and 272-273 and 275).

(R. 263-264

No explanation was given as to why the

down payment was borrowed if she had the amount in savings that
she claimed to have.
The evidence was disputed as to whether Mr. Yeaman made
any repairs or performed any maintenance to the residence during
the course of the marriage.

Mr. Yeaman testified that put up the

drywall in one room, replaced doors, painted the downstairs and
ceiling, wallpapered the hallways, two bathrooms, kids7 room

and

downstairs and fixed the pool pumps, Jacuzzi and sprinkler
system.

(R. 208). Ms. Yeaman denies that he did anything.

274) .
12

(R.

The circumstances surrounding the execution of a quit
claim deed by Mr. Yeaman regarding the marital residence are
disputed.

However, said deed is irrelevant to the division of

the sale proceeds in a divorce proceeding.

Mr. Yeaman testified

that he signed the deed in order that Ms. Yeaman would no longer
harass him by sitting outside of his place of residence and
making numerous calls to him and his friends.

(R. 278). He did

not think that he was giving up his interest in the property and
was so advised by an attorney.

(R. 209). He also testified that

he did not receive any money in regard thereto.

(R. 218).

Ms. Yeaman alleged that Mr. Yeaman approached her and
said he would execute a deed if she would pay him $500.00.
According to her, the parties purchased a form deed which she
completed at the desk of a secretary at the bank and the deed was
signed at the bank where she withdrew $700.00 and paid it to Mr.
Yeaman.

A bank statement was introduced by Ms. Yeaman which

showed a withdrawal of $700.00. (R. 230).
Ms. Yeaman testified that she paid her companion who
resides with her, Jeff Dillingham, $1,675 to make some repairs
and do some painting in order to sell the home.
267).

(R. 241-242 and

She testified that she obtained a loan of $1,500.00 in

order to pay him.

(R. 242). However, Mr. Dillingham testified

that he received a deposit of $500.00 and monthly payments of
$300.00.

(R. 286).
In Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) the

plaintiff, prior to the divorce, had a one-fourth interest in a
13

house, title thereto being held by plaintiff, defendant and
defendant's parents as tenants in common.

The Utah Supreme Court

stated:
The state of title to marital property prior to a
divorce decree is not necessarily binding on the trial
court in its distribution of such property pursuant to
such decree. The trial court is empowered to make such
distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel
such conveyances as are necessary to that end.
Id. at 340-341.
In Hoaqland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App.
1993) the court divided equally the proceeds from the sale of
marital residence purchased during marriage which husband had
conveyed to wife during marriage and stated:
Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long
held that once a court has determined that something is
marital property, the court may distribute it
equitably, notwithstanding which party's name appears
on the title.
See, Hocrue v. Hogue, 831 P. 2d 120 (Utah App. 1992) (Court awarded
husband an undivided one-half interest in ranch which husband had
conveyed to wife prior to marriage).
The above-described deed in the instant case has no
relevance to the division of the property by the court.

If the

marital residence had been in the name of Mr. Yeaman from the
date of purchase, the Court would have still had the power to
divide it equally between the parties.

The fact that there is a

deed from Mr. Yeaman to Ms. Yeaman does not remove the marital
residence from the marital estate.

The status of the title to

the marital residence is not in any manner binding upon the
Court.
14

It appears from the trial court's Memorandum Decision
that the trial court made an error of law.

Therein the trial

court stated:
[T]he plaintiff voluntarily executed the deed creating
a valid and legal conveyance whose presumption of
legality can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. The Plaintiff has presented no evidence to
defeat the legal consequence of a document that he
admittedly, freely and voluntarily signed.
(R. 100). From this statement it appears that the trial court
thought that by the deed the residence had been removed from the
marital estate.

As discussed above, according to Utah lawf the

residence was not removed from the marital estate and should have
been divided equitably by the trial court.
Furthermore, there are no circumstances which justify
departing from the general rule that "marital assets are to be
divided as equally as possible." Moore and Moore, 829 P.2d 704,
705 (Or.App. 1992).

In Naranao v. Naranao. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147

(Utah App. 1988) this court set forth some of the circumstances
which must be considered by the trial court in fashioning an
equitable property division and stated:
[T]rial courts must consider all of the pertinent
circumstances, including the amount and kind of
property to be divided, the source of the property, the
parties7 health, the parties' standard of living and
respective financial conditions, their needs and
earning capacities, the duration of the marriage, what
the parties gave up by the marriage, and the
relationship the property division has with the amount
of alimony awarded.
The trial court apparently did not consider any of the above
factors except perhaps the amount and kind of property to be
divided.

None of the above factors exist which would support the
15

award of the sale proceeds to Ms. Yeaman.

The findings herein

are inadequate for review because they are not "sufficiently
detailed and [do not] include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached."

Rucker v. DaIton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).

In the instant case there are no subsidiary facts but only
ultimate conclusions.

The proceeds from the sale of the marital

residence should have been divided equally between the parties.
II. Mr. Yeaman Should have been Awarded an Equitable
Share of the Miscellaneous Personal Property Including
the Household Furniture, Furnishings and Appliances.
On page 4 of its Memorandum Decision the Court stated:
The Court further awards to the Defendant the balance
of any personal property now in her possession since
they were mainly acquired by her efforts without any
contribution from the Plaintiff.
As stated above, the general rule is that marital
assets are to be divided as equally as possible.
at 704.

Moore. 829 P.2d

in Hatayama v. Hatavama. 818 P.2d 277, 282 (Hawaii App.

1991) the court stated:
Divorce is not a vehicle by which one spouse is
compensated for having given more than he or she
received during the marriage or for having had to
suffer during the marriage from the other spouse's
inadvertent, negligent, or intentional inadequacies,
failures, or wrongdoings, financial or otherwise. In
other words, evidence that the husband or the wife was
a bad mate . . . provider, income producer, investor,
manager of money, handyperson . . . or the like, is not
relevant to the issue of the division and distribution
of property. If such evidence was relevant, each
spouse would be well-advised to prepare from the date
of the marriage for the possibility of a divorce by
meticulously keeping score in a daily diary. . . .
Allowing it to be such a vehicle would be contrary to
the public policy in favor of loving, trusting,
harmonious marriages . . . .
16

A division of the property based upon who contributed more
financially to the marriage is not supported by law.
Furthermore, Mr. Yeaman testified that he did work
during the marriage.

Mr. Yeaman testified that he was employed

90% of the time during the marriage and that he gave his income
to Ms. Yeaman who deposited it in her checking account.
207).

(R. 206-

Mr. Yeaman7s testimony was that he had not filed a tax

return because he was entitled to a refund not that he hadn't
made enough to require filing a tax return.

(R. 218). The only

evidence in opposition thereto was Ms. Yeaman's testimony that
Mr. Yeaman was unemployed except for a couple of months during
the marriage.

(R. 195).

Mr. Yeaman testified that the property acquired during
the marriage was a dining room table, bunkbeds, stereo, china
hutch, pool assets, couches and chairs.

(R. 202 and 214). He

testified that $1,500.00 was paid toward the china hutch prior to
the marriage and the remaining $300.00 was paid after the
marriage.

(R. 210). Ms. Yeaman had no knowledge regarding the

payments on the china hutch and testified that $200.00 was paid
for the china hutch after the parties were married.

(R. 255-

256) . Ms. Yeaman did not dispute that the above items were
purchased during the marriage.

(R. 253). On a financial

declaration submitted by Ms. Yeaman the household items were
valued at $30,000.00 and no claim was made that any of said the
items referred to therein were property which she acquired prior
to the marriage.

(R. 30-36).

At the trial Ms. Yeaman testified
17

that all of the household furnishings except those stated above
were hers prior to the marriage.

(R. 253). She further claimed

that the sterling silver, china, crystal, antiques, linen,
tablecloths and heirlooms had been stolen and that the value of
said items was $10,000.00.

(R. 193-194).

Ms. Yeaman testified that she was employed by American
Express for approximately fourteen and a half years of which
approximately one and a half years were during the marriage and
that she would receive approximately $12,000.00 as a retirement
benefit.

(R. 188-189).

All of said interest was awarded to Ms.

Yeaman.
According to the testimony of Ms. Yeaman there was no
value to Kinetico and Power Play products was a business owned by
Mr. Yeaman prior to the marriage.

(R. 194-195).

Mr. Yeaman was

awarded any interest that he may have in any business enterprise.
In Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988)
the court listed the pertinent circumstances that trial courts
must consider in fashioning an equitable property division and
none of the factors was the amount of financial contribution
during the marriage.

The Utah Court of Appeals stated as

follows:
Trial courts xneed be guided by the general purpose to
be achieved by a property division, which is to
allocate the property in a manner which best serves the
needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue
their separate lives.' (citations omitted).
Id. at 1148. The division of property in the instant case does
neither of the above and was not equitable.
18

Essentially all of

the property herein, real and personal, was awarded to Ms. Yeaitian
which is an abuse of discretion and defendant should be awarded
an equal share of the personal property.
III. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Mr. Yeaitian7s
Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment and Order or. in the Alternative.
Motion for a New Trial.
During discovery Mr. Yeaman requested documents from
Ms. Yeaman which were in her possession, custody or control or
her agents.

Said documents include the bank statements which Ms.

Yeaman used at trial to support her claimed contributions to the
marriage, the source of her contributions and her claim that Mr.
Yeaman did not financially contribute to the marriage.
127).

(R. 126-

Ms. Yeaman did not produce any records regarding a credit

union account which would have allowed Mr. Yeaman to verify the
claims which wife made at trial regarding Mr. Yeaman's
contributions and her contributions.

(R. 126-127 and 138-139).

Ms. Yeaman also failed to produce records regarding her
pension plan which could have been used as described above.
Ms. Yeaman's disclosure at trial that items of personal
property had been stolen allowed her to increase the value of the
items stolen and thus decrease the value of the items in her
possession.

As can be seen from the police report regarding the

stolen items, there is a large discrepancy between the report and
Ms. Yeaman7s testimony at the trial that the value of said items
is approximately $10,000.00.

(R. 141-145).

Furthermore, it is

unknown whether Ms. Yeaman was reimbursed for said items from
insurance.
19

Because of Ms. Yeaman7s tactics she has been able to
make it appear as though Mr. Yeaman should not be believed when
in fact it is Ms. Yeaman who should not be believed.

It is

unknown why the trial court awarded substantially all of the
property to Ms. Yeaman, but the trial court may have been
prejudiced by her tactics.

Accordingly, Mr. Yeaman should have

been awarded a new trial to present the evidence which was not
discovered because of Ms. Yeaman7s tactics.
Finally, because of Ms. Yeaman's failure to produce the
documents requested, it is unknown what the balance of the Key
Bank account and the credit union account was at the time of
divorce.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that:
[A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered . . . amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court
. . . or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion
by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial.
. . . .

(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at
the trial.
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision or order that is against the
law.
(7) Error in law.
Pursuant to the above provisions Mr. Yeaman should have been
granted a new trial or the existing ruling of the trial court
should have been modified.

It is an abuse of discretion to award

essentially all of the property of the parties to Ms. Yeaman and
then fail to allow Mr. Yeaman an opportunity to refute the
surprise testimony with the newly discovered evidence, all of
which was the result of the attempt by Ms. Yeaman to hide
relevant information from Mr. Yeaman.

Ms. Yeaman should be held

accountable to Mr. Yeaman for the dissipation of marital assets
if in fact any items have been stolen.

Jefferies v. Jefferies,

895 P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995).
CONCLUSION
Title to the marital residence should have no effect on
the division of the proceeds from the sale thereof.

The property

should have been divided equally since there are no factors which
would support an unequal division.

The income of Mr. Yeaman

during the marriage is irrelevant to the division of the property
between the parties.

Finally, Mr. Yeaman was prejudiced by Ms.

Yeaman's failure to produce documents which were requested during
discovery and, accordingly, Mr. Yeaman should be awarded an
opportunity to present evidence to rebut the testimony of Ms.
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Yeaman at the trial and to demonstrate that Ms. Yeaman has not
been candid with the Court.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of October, 1995,

DAVID J. HODGSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
to Jayne DeMarco, c /o Louise DeMarco, 312 Walton Street, West
Hampstead, N.Y. ^1552 this

day of October, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A
Judgment and Order
and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

FILESBfa*rt!!2Tiw- ..'
Third Judicial District

NOV 1 0 1994
William W. Dowries, J r . (#0907)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES T. YEAMAN,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

3/r?/^3

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 934900347
Judge Richard H. Moffat
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

JAYNE YEAMAN,
Defendant.

This matter came on for trial before the court on
September 9# 1994 before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Senior
Trial Judge.

Plaintiff appeared in person and through counsel,

David J. Hodgson, and defendant appeared in person and through
counsel, William W. Downes# Jr.

The court heretofore entered

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Based thereon,

and for good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendant Jayne Yeaman is awarded the net proceeds

derived from the sale of certain real property located at 10290
South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah

84094, in the sum of $28,712.37.

$5,000 of these funds has previously been disbursed to Jayne
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Yeaman.

The balance of these funds is currently held by

Superior Title Company of Utah# Inc.
2.

Defendant is awarded a 1989 Mercury automobile owned

by her prior to her marriage to plaintiff.

This vehicle is

awarded to defendant free and clear of any claim of plaintiff
and defendant is ordered to pay the indebtedness thereon.
3.

Defendant is awarded all personal property currently

in her possession.

Plaintiff is awarded all personal property

currently in his possession.
4.

Plaintiff and defendant are each awarded any retire-

ment accounts maintained in their respective names.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded any and all interest that may

have been accumulated in any business enterprises that he was
or is pursuing.
6.

Defendant is ordered to pay her tax liability owed to

the United States government and the State of Utah for income
tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992 as a result of
her separate income tax filing.
7.

Defendant is ordered to pay the balance owed on the

Optima card.
8.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay the amount owed to the

State of Utah in the sum of $259.06 and the amount owed to
David Patterson in the sum of $81.75.

Plaintiff is ordered to

hold defendant harmless on these sums.

2
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9.

Each party is ordered to pay their respective attorn-

ey 's fees in this matter.
10.

Defendant is restored her birth name and shall be

known hereafter as Jayne DeMarco.
11.

Plaintiff and defendant are each restrained from

having any contact with one another either in person, by
telephone or in any other manner.

Further, plaintiff and

defendant are each restrained from having any contact with the
employer of the other.

Further, defendant is restrained from

having any contact with Karen Clouse, a friend of the plaintiff.

Further, defendant is restrained from speaking to

plaintiff's children about the plaintiff.
DATED this

ff)

day of

W'fr)/

^

, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

David J.; Hodgson
Attorney for'Plaintiff
2763\onkr
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FILED DISTRICT U , ^ ;
Third Judicial District

NOV 1 0 1994

William W. Downes, Jr. (#0907)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Post Office Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

'iirij.>

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES T. YEAMAN,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
JAYNE YEAMAN,

Civil No. 934900347
Judge Richard H. Moffat
Commissioner Michael s. Evans

Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the
court on September 9, 1994, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Senior
Trial Judge, presiding.

Plaintiff appeared in person and

through counsel, David J. Hodgson, and defendant appeared in
person and through counsel, William W. Downes, Jr.

Previously,

on December 7, 1993, this court granted defendant a decree of
divorce from plaintiff.

Said decree was final upon entry.

The

court reserved all issues pertaining to property division and
debt allocation for further hearing.

The court heard all

lawful evidence in this matter on September 9, 1994. Based
thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby makes
and enters the following:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On October 23, 1991, the parties acquired certain

residential property located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy#
Utah

84070.

The property was acquired in the name of Jayne

Yeaman.
2.

After the parties acquired the property located at

10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah

84070, Jayne Yeaman quit-

claimed the property to herself and to plaintiff, Charles T.
Yeaman.
3.

Plaintiff and defendant cohabitated in the residence

until September, 1992, when they separated.

Defendant remained

in the residence and plaintiff moved elsewhere.
4.

The residence was sold on March 10, 1994.

The sale

of the residence, after payment of all liens and encumbrances,
yielded net proceeds in the sum of $28,712.37.

$5,000 of these

proceeds were tendered to defendant at the time of sale, and
the balance of the proceeds have been escrowed by the title
company, Superior Title Company of Utah, Inc., who closed this
real estate transaction.
5.

On September 24, 1993, plaintiff executed a quit-

claim deed conveying his interest in the property located at
10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah to defendant.

This deed was

properly notarized and duly recorded in the office of the Salt
Lake County Recorder on the 27th day of September, 1993.

2
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6.

Both parties testified that they went together and

purchased a quit-claim deed form by mutual agreement and that
the plaintiff would convey his interest in the home to the
defendant by the execution of the deed.

Defendant testified

that the plaintiff came to her with an offer to sell his
interest in the property to her for the payment of certain
cash.

She further testified that they went to the bank with

the quit-claim deed form where the deed was completed, typed,
signed and notarized by her banker.

She further testified

that, at the request of the plaintiff, she then withdrew from
her bank account the sum of $700 in cash and delivered it to
the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had requested this amount
for the conveyance of his interest in the property.
7.

The plaintiff does not deny that he signed the deed

and that he did so voluntarily, but denies that he received the
cash.

He states that he agreed to sign the deed in return for

defendant's promise not to harass him any further in the
future.

This is not a case where one of the parties is mis-

taken or does not remember.

It is a case where one of the

parties is not being truthful with the court.

The court gives

greater credence to the testimony of the defendant relative to
the payment of the cash and the execution of the deed since the
deed was completed at her bank and a bank officer notarized the
signatures.

3
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8.

Plaintiff voluntarily executed the quit-claim deed,

creating a valid and legal conveyance, whose presumption of
legality can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
The plaintiff has presented no evidence to defeat the legal
consequence of a document which he admittedly, freely and
voluntarily signed.
9.

Plaintiff conveyed to defendant all of his interest

in the property located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah
84070 when he signed the deed, and all of the proceeds of the
sale of the home are to be awarded to the defendant.
10.

During the course of the marriage, defendant worked

continually and paid for nearly all of the family expenses.
She maintains her own bank account, to which the plaintiff made
no contribution.

Although plaintiff worked for a few months

while the parties were together, he did not make sufficient
income to require the filing of income tax returns for the
years 1991 or 1992.
11.

Defendant acquired an automobile prior to her

marriage to plaintiff.

There is no equity in this vehicle.

This vehicle should be awarded to defendant free and clear of
any claim of plaintiff, and defendant should be ordered to pay
the indebtedness thereon.
12.

Plaintiff pawned a necklace belonging to defendant to

Craig Wardle.
is $445.

The amount of money still owed on this necklace

Defendant should be granted the right to redeem this
4
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necklace from Craig Wardle.

If the defendant chooses to redeem

the necklace, she is hereby awarded judgment against plaintiff
for the sum paid to Craig Wardle.

In order to obtain the

judgment, the defendant must redeem the necklace before the
final judgment in this case is filed.

The application for a

judgment in the final decree must be accompanied with an
affidavit of payment and a copy of a receipt from Craig Wardle.
13.

During the marriage of plaintiff and defendant,

defendant gave plaintiff $1,000 on February 6, 1992 that was in
the nature of a loan for a business enterprise pursued by
plaintiff.

It is not reasonable that plaintiff be ordered to

repay this loan, as defendant has not established that the
efforts of plaintiff were not for the joint benefit of both
parties.
14.

It is reasonable that defendant be awarded the

balance of any personal property now in her possession, since
they were mainly acquired by her efforts without any contribution from the plaintiff.
15.

Defendant should be awarded any and all interest that

may have accumulated in her retirement accounts because of her
employment over the years. Plaintiff should be awarded any and
all interest he may have in any business enterprise that he was
or is pursuing.
16.

It is reasonable that defendant pay her tax liabili-

ties owed to the United States government and the State of Utah
5
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for income tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992.
17.

Defendant should be ordered to pay the balance owed

on her Optima card.
18.

It is reasonable that plaintiff pay, and hold defen-

dant harmless on, the amount owed to the State of Utah in the
sum of $259.06 and the amount owed to David Patterson in the
sum of $81.75.
19.

It is reasonable that each party pay their own

attorney's fees.
20.

It is reasonable that defendant be restored her birth

name of Jayne DeMarco.
21.

It is reasonable that a mutual restraining order

issue restraining plaintiff and defendant from having any
contact with one another either in person, by telephone or in
any other manner.

Further, it is reasonable that plaintiff and

defendant be restrained from having any contact with each
other's employer.

Further, it is reasonable that defendant be

restrained from having any contact with Karen Clouse, a friend
of the plaintiff.

Further, it is reasonable that defendant be

restrained from speaking to plaintiff's children about the
plaintiff.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court
hereby enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff conveyed his entire interest in certain
6
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residential property located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy,
Utah, to defendant for the sum of $700.

This real estate

transaction was entered into by plaintiff and defendant voluntarily.

Accordingly, it is reasonable that the proceeds from

the sale of the residence be awarded to defendant.
2.

It is reasonable that defendant be awarded the

automobile acquired by her before the marriage.
3.

Defendant shall be granted the right to redeem a

pawned necklace from Craig Wardle.

Should defendant elect to

redeem the necklace prior to the entry of the final judgment in
this matter, defendant shall be granted a judgment against
plaintiff in a sum equal to the amount necessary to redeem the
necklace.

In order to obtain the judgment, defendant must

redeem before the final judgment in this case is filed.

The

application for judgment must be accompanied by an affidavit of
payment and a copy of the receipt from Craig Wardle.
4.

Both plaintiff and defendant shall be awarded that

personal property maintained by them in their possession.
5.

Plaintiff and defendant shall each be awarded any

retirement accounts maintained in their respective names.
6.

Plaintiff shall be awarded any and all interest that

may have been accumulated in any business enterprise that he
was or is pursuing.
7.

Defendant shall be ordered to pay her tax liability

owed to the United States government and the State of Utah for
7
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income tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992.
8.

It is reasonable that defendant pay the balance owed

on the Optima card.
9.

It is reasonable that each party be ordered to pay

their respective attorney's fees in this matter.
10.

It is reasonable that defendant be restored her birth

name and be known hereafter as Jayne DeMarco.
11.

A mutual restraining shall issue restraining plain-

tiff and defendant from having any contact with one another
either in person, by telephone or in any other manner; a mutual
restraining order shall issue restraining plaintiff and defendant from having any contact with each other's employer; a
restraining order shall issue restraining defendant from having
any contact with Karen Clouse, a friend of the plaintiff; and a
restraining order shall issue restraining defendant from
speaking to plaintiff's children about the plaintiff.

DATED this l\)

day of

Nfl\J

*

1994.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

David J
Attorne

<j^ ^
jjfo
odqpon
for 'Plaintiff

2763\ffcl
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ADDENDUM B
Memorandum Decision

Thud

,^iul P:;;n.t

SEP 2 ? 1£94
SALT LAKfyCOUgVY _

By

^Slctep^)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
:

CHARLES T. YEAMAN,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

JAYNE YEAMAN,

S
Defendant.

:;

Civil No. 934900347 DA

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on
September 9, 1994.

The divorce in this case has been previously

granted and the only issue left to be determined at this hearing
was the distribution of property accumulated during the marriage.
After hearing the evidence and reviewing the exhibits presented by
the parties the Court took the matter under advisement and rules as
hereinafter stated.
The principal

area

of disagreement

between

the parties

involves the status of the home purchased by the parties in October
of 1991 and which home was sold after the separation of the
parties.

The money from the sale is being held in escrow pending

this determination.
On September 24, 1993, long after the separation of the
parties, the Plaintiff executed a Quit-Claim Deed conveying his
interest in the property to the Defendant and which deed was duly
notarized and recorded.
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Both parties testified that they went together and purchased
a Quit-Claim Deed Form by mutual agreement and that the Plaintiff
would convey his interest in the home to the Defendant by the
execution of the deed. The Defendant testified that the Plaintiff
came to her with an offer to sell his interest in the property to
her for the payment of certain cash.

She further testified that

they then went to her bank with the Quit-Claim Deed Form where the
deed was completed and typed and signed and notarized by her
banker. She further testified that at the request of the Plaintiff
she then withdrew from her bank account the sum of seven hundred
($700.00) dollars in cash and delivered it to the Plaintiff and
that the Plaintiff had requested this amount for the conveyance of
his interest in the property.
The Plaintiff does not deny that he signed the deed and that
he did so voluntarily but denies that he received the cash.
states

that

he

agreed

to

sign

the

deed

in

return

He

for the

Defendants promise not to harass him any further in the future.
This is not a case where one of the parties is mistaken or does not
remember.

It is a case where one of the parties is not being

truthful with the Court.

The Court gives greater credence to the

testimony of the Defendant relative to the payment of the cash and
the execution of the deed since the deed was completed at her bank
and a bank officer notarized the signatures.
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Regardless of this finding however, the Plaintiff voluntarily
executed the deed creating a valid and legal conveyance whose
presumption

of

legality

convincing evidence.

can

only

be

overcome

by

clear

and

The Plaintiff has presented no evidence to

defeat the legal consequence of a document that he admittedly,
freely and voluntarily signed.
Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff conveyed all of
his interest in the property to the Defendant when he signed the
deed and that all of the proceeds of the sale of the home are to be
awarded to the Defendant.
The

Court

further

finds that

during

the

course

of the

marriage, the Defendant worked continually and paid for nearly all
of the family expenses and that she maintained her own bank account
to which

the

Plaintiff

made no contribution.

Although the

Plaintiff worked for a few months while the parties were together,
he did not make enough to require his filing of income tax returns
for the years 1991 and 1992.
The Court therefore awards to the Defendant her automobile
subject to the outstanding indebtedness owed thereon and in which
automobile there appears to be no equity.
The Court finds that the Plaintiff pawned a necklace belonging
to the Defendant to CRAIG WARDLE upon which there is still owing
the sum of four hundred ($445.00) forty-five dollars.

The Court
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awards the right of redemption in -the necklace to the Defendant and
if the Defendant chooses to redeem the necklace she is hereby
awarded judgment against the Plaintiff for the sum paid to CRAIG
WARDLE.

In order to obtain the judgment the Defendant must redeem

before the final judgment in this case is filed and must accompany
the application to include such a judgment in the final Decree with
a Affidavit of Payment and a copy of a receipt from CRAIG WARDLE.
The Court

further finds that the Defendant gave to the

Plaintiff the sum of one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars on February
6, 1992, that was in the nature of a loan for a business enterprise
being pursued by the Plaintiff.

The Court will not order the

Plaintiff

since the Defendant

to

repay

this amount

did not

establish that the efforts of the Plaintiff in the attempted
business enterprise were not for the joint benefit of both parties.
The Court further awards to the Defendant the balance of any
personal property now in her possession since they were mainly
acquired

by

Plaintiff.

her

efforts

without

any

contribution

from

the

The Court further awards to the Defendant any and all

interest that she may have accumulated in her retirement accounts
because of her employment over the years.
The Court awards to the Plaintiff any and all interest that
may have been accumulated in any business enterprises that he was
or is pursuing.
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The Court orders that the Defendant assume and pay the tax
liabilities owed to the United States Government and the State of
Utah for income tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992 and
any balance owed on the Optima Card.
The Court further orders that the Plaintiff pay and hold
Defendant harmless on the amount owed to the State of Utah in the
sum of two hundred fifty-nine ($259.06) dollars and six cents, the
amount owed to DAVID PATTERSON in the sum of eighty one ($81.75)
dollars and seventy-five cents.
The Court further orders that each of the parties pay their
own court costs and attorney's fees.
The Court further orders that the attorney for the Defendant
prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree for the
Court's signature in accordance with this Decision.
DATED this^lC^ *day of September, 1994.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20"

day of September, 1994, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
David J. Hodgson
Attorney at Law
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

William W. Downes, Jr.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorney at Law
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668

VJot

•0^

Secretary

In compliance with the American! with Disabilities Act.
individuals needing special accommodations (inducing
communicative aids and services) during this pioceecin^
should call 1400-992-0172. at least THREE working
days prior to lie scheduled proceeding.

A A r*
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ADDENDUM C
Judge's Bench Ruling

m n , . FILED
DfSI RICT COURT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO&fcT-J
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
CHARLES T. YEAMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAYNE YEAMAN,
Defendant.

RULING ON OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECREE AND FURTHER
RULING ON THE MOTION TO
ALTER AND AMEND FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Civil No. 934900347

This case was tried by this Court on September 9, 1994,
covering the issue of property distribution.

The Court took the

matter under advisement and entered its Memorandum Decision on the
20th day of September, 1994. Because of some misunderstanding and
without proper authority, Finding's of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
a Judgment and Order were signed by the Honorable Judge Frank G.
Noel on November 10, 1994. The Plaintiff had pending at that time
an Objection to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Judgment that
was dated October 6, 1994, and that Objection was never ruled upon.
Plaintiff then filed on November 21, 1994, a Motion to Alter the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as signed by
Judge Noel. On December 21, 1994, the Defendant filed her response
to those objections and the Motion to Alter.
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This Court then ordered in accordance with Rule 4-504 of the
Code

of Judicial Administration,

that

the Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Judgment signed by Judge Noel be set aside
and that they would be treated as proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree to which the Plaintiff had filed
Objections and a Motion to Alter on the grounds and for the reasons
stated in his Motions and accompanying Memorandum.
The Court has now received all Motions and pleadings regarding
the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and
rules on the same as hereinafter stated.
Plaintiff

first

contends

that

he

should

be

awarded

an

equitable share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital
residence.

All of Plaintiff/s arguments regarding this issue are

without merit.

The home had ceased to be a marital asset when the

Plaintiff, after the separation of the parties, voluntarily and for
good consideration conveyed his interest in the property to the
Defendant.

The law is clear that married parties are free to

convey property between themselves and can certainly do so to
settle a distribution of assets on separation.
The Plaintiff

further contends that he should have been

awarded an equitable share of the miscellaneous personal property
including the household furniture, furnishings and appliances.
Again the Court is not persuaded by the arguments of the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff attempts to present at this time evidence based
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entirely upon prior declarations of the Defendant relative to the
quantity of the property and its value.

These declarations were

contrary to her testimony at trial where she explained those
discrepancies.

The Court has found that the testimony of the

Defendant at trial is believable and that the parties had very
little by way of personal property of any value and for the reasons
stated in the Memorandum Decision the division should be made as
stated.
Plaintiff next contends that he was prejudiced by Defendant's
failure to provide certain documents requested during discovery.
Ordinarily objections relative to discovery are taken care of by
Motions to Compel or Motions made during trial to exclude evidence
or to produce further evidence.
However, the Court can find no prejudice to the Plaintiff in
this regard and will not, at this time, reopen the case regarding
matters that should have been addressed either prior to trial or
during the trial.
The Court therefore denies any objections to the proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and the Motion
made by the Plaintiff for a new trial.
The Court further declines to grant the Motion for any further
hearing since a hearing would not provide any additional material
that is not presently before the Court.
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This

Court

has

on

this

day

signed

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment in accordance with its prior
Memorandum Decision and this Order and further orders that those
documents be entered as the final decree of the Court.
DATED this J^j^aay of

Sy?^*^/?si,,/

, 1995.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

31*

day of January, 1995, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE AND FURTHER
RULING ON THE MOTION TO ALTER AND AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT AND ORDER was mailed, postage
prepaid, to the following:
David J. Hodgson
Attorney at Law
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

William W. Downes, Jr.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorney at Law
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
P.O. Box 2668
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.
individuals needing special accommodations (inducing
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding
should call 1-800-992-0172, at least THREE working
days ooct to th-« scheduled proceeding.
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ADDENDUM D
Police Report

e

N^s n
"ISSm^M
UTU1M100

»CASE*

MLDVALE POLICE D E P A R T M E N T
8 0 East Center St. - Mid vale, Utah 8 4 0 4 7

HlzW

CASE REPORT

|

UNFOUNDED

TEL > £ —
M1SD. O

| SUPPLEMENT

OFFICIAL
in *• r

i t , MJddU)
COMPLAINANT^!(Leat,F)J/*

1

HLO.I)

i

j

<=?-$- S A

f.^^O

ADDRESS: (Stnet, City, StaU, Zip)

^

T ~ ^ d T ^ o 3

LOCATION OF INCIDENT: (Addraea if dlfTereat tkaa eh«*re)

^^

A/C

OfTENSE DESCRIPTION (See Lbr)

°\\y *BUUMHI»^ »A &^$/>j^.f

HTJ

< ; —

HATI BUB CODES:
RACJAL '
11. ANTI • WHITE
12. ANTI- BLACK
D.ANTI-AM.D4DUN/
ALASKAN NATIVE
14 - ANTI - ASIAN/PAC.ISL.
U - ANTI - MULTl RACIAL
» . NONE (NO BIAS)
» - UNKNOWN

4

GANG.
Y (^N

ITHWCrTT^AT19P*ALQRC,
31-ANTI-ARAB
32 •ANTI *H1SPANIC
33 - ANTI - OTHER ETHNICITY/
NATIONAL ORJODJ

A/C CODtS:
A-ATTEMPTED
C- COMPLETED

Q

A-ALCOHOL

Q

C-COMPUTER EQUIP.

Q

D-DRUGS

Q

N . NOT APPLICABLE

9

^ y / \

kTor BurgUiy Only)
NUMBER OF
(PREMISES ENTERED

8

D
O
Q

/
/

RiLiCJOJB
31- ANTI- JEWISH
3-ANTI-CATHOLIC
3 . ANTI - PROTESTANT
24- ANTI • ISLAMIC (MOSLEM)
25 - ANTI • OTHER REUOION
24. ANTI - MULTl REUOIOUS
GROUP
27 - ANTI - ATHEISM / AGNOSTIC
SEXUAL
4 1 . ANTI • MALE HOMOSEXUAL
42 - ANTI - FEMALE HOMOSEXUAL
43 • ANTI • HOMOSEXUAL
44-ANTI- HETEROSEXUAL
45- ANTI- BISEXUAL

B-BUYTNO/
C - CULTTV. / MANUF. / PUBLISH.
D.DISTRJBUTWG/SELLING
E • EXPLOrnNO CHILDREN
O - OPERATWO / PROMOTING / ASSIST.
P * POSSESSINO / CONCEALING
T - TRANSPORT. / TRANSMIT. / IMPORT.

METHOD

c
T
I
M

DO-OTHER
QU-UNKNOWNJ

D.OJL

SEX
QM-MALE
dM-FEMALE
QU-UNKNOWN

Ml R-«-s4

INJURY TYPE: (Check Up To Fire)

TYPE WEAPON / FORCE INVOLVED:
rvOLVEJ>.
(Check Up To Throe)
e^J
(Enter A ui Box If Automatic)

,,
-FIREARM
(type not slated)
12-HANDOUN
V3-RIFLE

O
D
Q
D

31

a5-FIRE/INCENDIARY
DEVICE
70 - DRUGS / NARCOTICS /
SLEEPING PILLS
90-OTHER
95-UNKNOWN ,K
99-NONE

SECURITY

T

piVU*iki/

14 HOTEL/MOTEL ETC
15 JAIL/PRISON
14 -LAKE/WATERWAY
17 > LIQUOR STORE
IB . PARKING LOT / GARAGE
IP . RENTAL / STORAGE FAC.
20 RESIDENCE /HOME
21 RESTAURANT
22 SCHOOL/COLLEGE
23 SERVICE / OAS STATION
24 SPECIALTY STORE (TV. FUR ETC.)
25 OTHER/UNKNOWN

PREMISE SECURITY CODE:
01-ALARM SYSTEM
02-BARS
OJ. DEAD BOLTS
04- INTERIOR LIGHTS
05-EXTERIOR LIGHTS
06-CAMERA
07-DOG
0 8 . LD. PROGRAM
09 -SECURITY FENCE
10. GUARD
11-SEC TYPATROL
89-NON L
99.OTHER

NOTE: IF AUTOMATIC
WEAPON ADD -A" TO
WEAPON CODE

TOOLS USED

u.

\

LOCATION OF OFFENSE CODES:
01-AJR/BUS/TRAIN TERMINAL
02 • BANK / SAVINGS A LOAN
03 -BAR /NIGHT CLUB
0 4 . CHURCH/SYNAGOGUE
05- COMMERCIAL/ OFFICE BLDO.
06 - CONSTRUCTION SITE
07-CONVENIENCE STORE
0« - DEPARTMENT STORE
09 - DRUO STORE / DR*S OFF. / HOSP.
10 - FIELD / WOODS
11-OOVERNMENT/PUBUCBLDa
12-GROCERY/SUPERMARKET
13 • HIGHWAY / ROAD / ALLEY

diL ,tW//5

TOOLS USED CODE:
01-PRY DEVICE
02-CLUB OR HAMMER
03-GRIPPING DEVICE
0 4 . SAW
05-BOLT CUTTERS
06-ROCK/BRICK
07- GLASS CUTTER
OS-SUP DEVICE
09-CUTTING TORCH
10-ELECTRONIC EQUIP.
99-OTHER

PHONE 0

I TliICTIM ETHNICITY:
RACE:
QH.HISPANIC
d ^ . W H T T E QA-ASIAN
QB-BLACK QU-UNKNOWN
fj^-NON-HISPANIC
Ql-DOIAN
QU.UNKNOWN

01-ARGUMENT
02-ASSAULT ON LAW OFFICER
03-DRUG DEALING
04-GANGLAND

QM-SHOTOUN
Q 1 5 - OTHER FIREARM
Q 2 0 - KNIFE / CUTTINO
INSTRUMENT

I * HI:
8

L_J

_ .

RESIDENT STATUS:
DR.RESIDENT
Vo*NONRESIDENT
QU-UNKNOWN

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT / HOMICIDE CIRCUMSTANCES:
(Check Up To TWe)

W^-NONE
D M- MINOR INJURY
QB-BROKEN BONES
n o - M A J O R INJURY
Q I-POSS. INT.INJURIES
DT-LOSSOFTEETH
D L-SEVERELACERATION O U • UNCONSCIOUSNESS

_3
0 4
QOTHER.

HATE AFFILIATION CODES:
01- YOUTH OANO
02- ADULT OANO
03 - ANTI • OOVERNMENT
04. REUOIOUS CULT
05 • NON-REUOIOUS CULT
M-SATANIC CULT
07-TRIBB
0t-ENVIRONMENTAL
Of - ANIMAL PROTECTION
10-LIFE PROTECTION
9f-OTHER

(

WEAPON(S)

J ^ ;1bre«»«tC r y t c .

fcAM*^
ACl

•G-GOVERNMENT
Q R - REUOIOUS
Q S - SOCIETY /PUBUC

a

)

ADDRESS (Street, City, State, Zip)

TYPE OF VICTIM: (Check OaJy Oae)

VICTIM CONNECTED TO
OFFENSE NUMBER:

BUS. PHONE:

0 F-FORCED

r V a t t O , <J*M kit
Jl^i-INDIVIDUAL
QB-BUSINESS
QF-FTNANCIAL

)

LOCATION

HATE AFT.

WEAPON CODES:
11 • FIREARM (UNKTYPE)
12-HANDGUN
13-RIFLE
14-SHOTGUN
15-OTHER FIREARM
20 - KNIFE / CUTTING INST
30- BLUNT OBJECT
35-MOTOR VEHICLE
40 - PERSONAL WEAPON
50 -POISON
60-EXPLOSIVES

NAMEJLaet, F l p t , Middle)

VICTLM #

V
I

H. BIAS

C gg>

TYPE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY:
(Check Up To T i m )

OFFENDERS) USED:
(Check as many aa apply) J

^

.

HOMI . .lONEi f^

"tea* 97^-9o8l

Or. g<//l1

*L.

O Q ( O Extradite*
g O (D) V k t refuaad te
Q (E) Juv«ill*N«curt»4r
Q (N) Nei Applkaele

1 CLEARED BY ARREST

DOB.::

DATE ,
Q (A) Death eforTaaaar
U) Q (B) PrwMCUttM

C Z 3 INACTIVE

•""l(,;oo

REPORT TYPE:
S Z L INITIAL REPORT

\y

TVE

TIME

REPORT DAT*

\ CLEARED EXCEPTIONALLY

CASE STATUS:

•
D
Q
Q

M/4-

Q 0 4 B - NEC MANSLAUGHTER
D 05- JUVENILE GANG
D 06. LOVERS'QUARREL
Q 07- MERCY KILLING

30 -BLUNT OBJECT
3 * -MOTOR VEHICLE
40 . PERSONAL WEAPONS
50-POISON

Q 08-OTHER FELONY INVOLVED
Q 09 - OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
D 09C - JUSTIFIABLE
Q 10 • UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES

O 60-EXPLOSIVES
O 65 - FIRE / INCENDIARY
D 70 - NARCOTICS / DRUOS
Q*5-ASPHYXIATION

Q90-OTHER
D 95 - UNKNOWN
Q99-NONE

RELATIONSHIP OF VICTIM TO OFFENDER:
(For multiple offender relationships enter offender numbers) b apaos)
SB-SPOUSE
CS-COMMON-LAW
SPOUSE
PA-PARENT
SB-STBUNO

mmmmmmmm

_

_

CH-CHILD
OC - GRANDCHILD
IL-IN-LAW
SP-STEPPARENT
SC-STEPCHILD

. SS - STEPSTBUNO
. O F - O T H E R FAMILY
. AQ-ACQUAJNTANCB
, FR-FRIEND
, N E -NEIGHBOR

. BE - BABYSTTTEE (beby)
. BO - BOY / GIRL FRIEND
. CF - CHILD OF •BO' ABOVE
. HH - HOMOSEXUAL REL
.XS-EX-SPOUSE

.
.
.
.
.
.

EE-EMPLOYEE
ER-EMPLOYER
OK - OTHERWISE KNOWN
ST-STRANGER
VO-VICTIM WAS OFFENDER
RU-RELATIONSHIP UNKNOWN

i

<*ys
M&Oto iO

T^i*s

H<a. rAof>e<nu£ CL) SywTo lr

LvQdLZXL
p. SIGNATURE
<NWini v n b

•

C O / M Thtac ^p

ES j Ldtw ^rtMi
n>#

'Mat

W€. Sf*fc*

DAU^tr.

y<a 77/gM.

JAPPKOVED
PACE

L

OF
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CONTINUATION
C

L

A

S

S

I

F

I

C

A

T

LIST AOOlflONAL VICTIMS. SUSPECTS. INFO. ETC

I

O

N

^

F

NARRATIVE I SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

^t> <Jtr ;^go

he* USsT.

t°J

R

S

T

2 OBSERVATIONS
ERVVTIONS

Cj SPm^o S*t /J/5 /.+*r*r~ USr
Udiv<r

I

M

L

J CASE N O

3 ARREST
3

4 BOOKING AND ADDITIONAL

o± s/z^/W Q^ *//z/y/

*(J*TV4

#

MiWrn

AfrJo w<.^Y~

tl
-roJ/lZ

T?ic LeKAcs> £><*<*> &»<k \A<ic Sn^/»/* S*f*rac C ) "^nmo u)*4e*± S*i£ qor yt>
^ycht^tut. (JtJ'>r^ yurrr- ! W t^m. AJcfPi*/**} /ft*. Cl^^T H*K> AS/) 6<rdc^

UdUij
LP\TV

fa>n

~~&sertt& U>z>c<
taJ/^r
/KC"

"YUU

&

q^o \L,

yg/eiM

T*4*x.4 .

So

S / L/T»

S | Lirvk

U^ F*o»ir

Smrrtx)

~T~b>6Tt- "N^OOIIS.

Y)a>s.*t,

'ff/D /ht^iQio

OpF>Q> ^ * Lexic'us + Wu/ri*'^^loIt*e

/frti. ^yyi^i— U3>»^

/o

G/

4\*rp

d/

Lt*-r~

~THe.^

ob'nXj^tg

C)

/ s xJpr Sc<*<f g»*

"&gyrfs . C/ /^ Su*c4. &y* T ^ M A L,ism&.
r

\J>CJJ^

. Utr- fj

JZ^S<^^

OJ

^WiiA LOfKjc &u*r~ <5P ^ 0
^J

"*

^ ^

C-j

Lcyj-O^

^ - ' y ^

#tTl-*>TKyO

A/tfC^J

A / D ^^C^>I O>O

•„-.!

Sp>rf-*r>

/JM+J

,^^^^^,5

A^»>

SH<6

~^TD ^ |

^

A

Ln-irnr

tnrM-

r

^8- ^koj^cs/b^g>o

j^W

V***"

S7 ^ ^

Cssd£^

Httt UtX?'.

Dotn<^

jb^o jJi^i-r- 7b £irS~tl

(Zfl^fe/^WcNO*

tret CaOTrtcr~ zO"i?vi 5s/ LiW,

-^BiCtArUT

^- /.<? r

^eg^£) c&//> O^ou^ir

ST^RQ

<?#i?c

—r *f

S^g.

^r

S/^rw-

^f L*n+

^4

6 0 ^

Cf L<)s/f

hsrC^t
i/

i /

t

^ / 6 i W lUH*tA~

Re*)T*o

W3 l/*Jt V.

I A^r tfw}
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CONTINUATION
COMPLAINANTS

CLASSIFICATION

LIST ADDITIONAL VICTIMS. SUSPECTS. INFO. ETC.

T^~? ^taicaO
feur' Ad

&*~

/£hin*«i

t>ai *#-£0^

NARRATIVE 1. SOURCE OF ACTIVITY

L»C**-

—^p—

FlfST

CASE NO

9^-/15*7

>Jt
2. OBSERVATIONS
DBSERv/f

3 ARREST

a

€Ic>

4 BOOKING AND ADDITIONAL

Um)* tf*o Am 0>)e

r»H^O &

Svng U)OUL.Q.

OF.

Cutting

Q*De»tr. ' &I& attoc -r*e*\ tu^ c U ? , w t y uSill

£

*TL,I-

"*

/u
1^ lwv»i

r

-T^s

vo

A-c <r>o<.

^<g**i>

?a*M
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.

fo)*

J9E^S_

Mso

/O«fM

"H£X

S^o^i

^ c

"gfyAir.

AAAA A O

DAT

CASE*
COMPLETE A PROPERTY SEGMENT F O R
EACH TYPE O F PROPERTY LOSS IN A CASE

PROPERTY DETAIL

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION CODE TABLE:
(Into Number In Cod* Column)
10A • QUANTITY DRUG MEASURE
01 • AIRCRAFT
11 DRUG / NARCOTIC EQUIP.
02 • ALCOHOL
12 FARM EQUIPMENT
03 - AUTOMOBILES
13 FIREARMS
04-BICYCLES
14 GAMBLING EQUIPMENT
03-BUSES
15 HEAVY CONSTRUCTION /
06- CLOTHES /FURS
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
07 • COMPUTER HARDWARE /
16 HOUSEHOLD GOODS
SOFTWARE
17 JEWELRY / PREC METALS
08 • CONSUMABLE GOODS
IS LIVESTOCK
0 9 . CREDIT/ DEBIT CARDS
19 MERCHANDISE
10 - DRUGS / NARCOTICS
20 MONEY
TYPE PROPERTY
LOSS/ETC

R
O
P
E
R
T
Y

c c,

Ql.NONI

lie

Q2.BURNED
0 1 - COUNTERFEITED /
rORCID
Q4.DAMACID/
DESTROYED

REPORT TYPE:

fcusrm-

7>

L**ooL«.*r**«c

*

±J-

tfjijqq

INITIAL REPORT f~laSUPPLEMENT

21 • NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
22 - NONNEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
23 - OFFICE • TYPE EQUIPMENT
2 4 . OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES
U • PURSES / HANDBAGS
26.RADIOS/TVS/VCRS
27 • RECORDINGS • AUDIO / VISUAL
21 . RECREATIONAL VEHICLES
29 - STRUCTURES - SINGLE
OCCUPANCY DWELLINGS
30- STRUCTURES - OTHER DWELLINGS
3 1 - STRUCTURES - OTHER COMMERCIAL / BUSINESS

PROPERTY DES< IPTION
INCLUDE MAKE, MODEL, SIZE, TYPE. SERIAL *v COLOR, E T C

QTY.

CODE

HH- MS7
tar

VALUE

D

32 • STRUCTURES - INDUSTRIAL / MANUFACTURING
33 • STRUCTURES - PUBLIC / COMMUNITY
34 - STRUCTURES - STORAGE
35 - STRUCTURES - OTHER
36 • TOOLS • POWER / HAND
37-TRUCKS
3t • VEHICLE PARTS / ACCESSORIES
39-WATERCRAJT
77-OTHER
I f . PENDING INVENTORY
99-(
}

RCVD
VALUE

NCIC
DATE
ENTRY

DATE
REMOVED

NIC NUMBER

H*LO*R.S

it>

it

OS-RECOVERED

I<P
Qt-SUZZD
)(7.STOLEN

to

0 1 . UNKNOWN
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LCOQ^C
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U> WTEtfiCXO

U<VS.£,

ZMfeT6acD

KVSC
0*2*11 mx- Vl

QEVIDENCE (ONLT P i M i y
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TYPE PROPERTY
LOSS/ETC

CODE

LfeA>oy

QriiAiA.

CA^Q^ ^

*H*.r
H ***>

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
INCLUDE MAKE. MODEL. SIZE, TYPE, SERIAL i , COLOR, E T C

QTY.

VALUE

RCVD
VALUE

NCIC
DATE
DATE
ENTRY
REMOVED

NIC NUMBER

RCVD
VALUE

NCIC
DATE
DATE
REMOVED
ENTRY

NIC NUMBER

p
R
o
P
E
R
T
Y

01-NONE

Ik

D2-BURNED
0 J - COUNTXRJinTD /
FORCID

IU

Q4-DAMAGED/
DESTROYED
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Q«-SEIZED
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-TO
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R
O
P
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Ql-NONE

6*

CODE

I

| a » - COUNTERFEITED /
FORCED

IU

1
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PROPERTY DESCRIPTION
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O/TY.
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IQl-BURNED
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Q7-STOLEN
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VALUE

^
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